

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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4 August 1964  
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 4 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

(United States of America)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. G. CHELEV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV  
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA  
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. M. KLUSAK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU  
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEFSKI

Mr. H. SOKALSKI

Mr. A. SKORONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASEK

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. S. de PALMA

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the 204th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before we move to the agenda item for today, I have an announcement to make. In accordance with the last report of the co-Chairmen and the instructions of the Committee, the co-Chairmen have continued their discussions during the past two weeks on the development of an agreed basis for the working group, the question of the creation of which arose in connexion with the current discussion in plenary meetings of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the process of general and complete disarmament. They have not yet reached agreement. They are continuing their discussions.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In the considerations and suggestions which have been put forward in the Committee by the representatives of a number of non-aligned States during discussion of the question of the terms of reference of the working group, there are undoubtedly important elements which may contribute to the progress of our negotiations on the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In our view, because of this circumstance alone it would be untimely and not altogether wise to interrupt the discussion of this question in the Committee and to pass on to the discussion of other items on the Committee's agenda, as suggested by the representatives of Canada and Italy on 28 July (ENDC/PV.202, pp.21 et seq., pp.26,27). We think that, on the contrary, it would be appropriate to continue working on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

It seems to us that the suggestions of the non-aligned States enable us to give more depth to our discussion on this question and, given goodwill, it would be possible even at this session of the Committee to achieve some positive results in this field. We have already stated in a general way at the meeting on 21 July our attitude towards the suggestions of the representatives of India, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Ethiopia regarding the terms of reference of the working group (ENDC/PV.200, pp.24-26). Today we should like to dwell in rather more detail on what we consider to be the positive points contained in the views expressed by the representatives of the aforesaid non-aligned countries, as well as by Sweden, whose delegation also made its contribution on this question at the meeting on 28 July (ENDC/PV.202, pp.5 et seq.).

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As has been explained to the Committee by the representatives of the non-aligned States themselves who have put forward formulations for the basis of the activities of the working group, in drafting these formulations they were guided by the desire to find an acceptable basis for both sides. We consider that these attempts are in themselves useful. In seeking for such a basis, however, it is important not to lose sight of the main thing: namely, the need to work out, by joint efforts, such solutions to specific questions of general and complete disarmament as would really correspond to the aim of disarmament, the aim of eliminating the material means and instruments for waging war. In this case -- where the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is concerned -- such a criterion, which determines the value of any particular attempt to find a compromise approach, is the ensuring that the threat of the unleashing of a nuclear missile war would be eliminated at the earliest stage of disarmament; that is, at the first stage.

This criterion derives from the most vital, the most profound interests of all nations. If we approach from this point of view the evaluation of the suggestions made by the non-aligned States, we see that on the whole they meet this criterion. In one way or another, in all the suggestions made by the representatives of the non-aligned States it is envisaged that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except those which would form the "nuclear umbrella"--or, to use the terminology of some delegations, the "minimum deterrent", the "nuclear shield" --should be destroyed at the earliest possible stage of general and complete disarmament.

Thus the formulation suggested by the delegation of India at the meeting on 30 June states that the crux of the matter is --

"... ensuring that at the earliest practicable stage of the disarmament process the existing stocks of each nuclear side are reduced to the minimum level ... all other stocks of each nuclear side being destroyed under effective international control." (ENDC/PV.194, p.12)

The same idea appears in the formulation put forward by the delegation of Nigeria in its working document, dated 14 July, which mentions:

"... the elimination of all other means of delivering nuclear weapons at the earliest possible and practicable time, in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles." (ENDC/136)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In the suggestions of the delegation of the United Arab Republic which were also submitted on 14 July for consideration by the Committee, one of the tasks of the negotiations was formulated under paragraph (3) as follows:

"The method of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the earliest practicable stage." (ENDC/PV.198, p.17)

This idea is expressed somewhat less definitely in the suggestion of the Swedish delegation of 28 July, but it seems to appear there also, since in the formulation put forward by Mrs. Myrdal it is pointed out that the working group ought to begin from the position that the retention of the "nuclear shield" increases the possibility of an early elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles not included in this "shield" (ENDC/PV.202, p.8).

In the suggestions put forward by the non-aligned States there is also reflected another fundamental aspect of the elimination of delivery vehicles: namely, that the number of retained nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be strictly limited and minimum in order to ensure a situation in which the "nuclear umbrella" itself could not serve as an instrument for unleashing a nuclear missile war.

The representative of Ethiopia, Lij Imru, referred to this in his statement of 30 June when he indicated that the working group would discuss "in all its aspects and implications, the concept of the minimum nuclear deterrent". (ENDC/PV.194, p.28). In the statement of the representative of India, Mr. R.K. Nehru, at the same meeting on 30 June, the "minimum level" of a "nuclear umbrella" or "nuclear deterrent" was likewise stressed (ibid., p.12). In paragraph (2) of the formulation proposed by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, there is mention of --

"Retention of an agreed quantity of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which would serve the purpose of a minimum nuclear deterrent during the disarmament process ..." (ENDC/PV.198, p.17).

The Nigerian delegation in its working document also emphasized that only "an agreed quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles, the minimum" (ENDC/136) should be retained during the whole disarmament process. That the capacity of a "nuclear umbrella" or "shield" should be "at a low level" (ENDC/PV.202, p.10) was also indicated in the suggestion made by Mrs. Myrdal.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In all this there is expressed, as we see it, a perfectly natural and logical approach of the non-aligned States to the problem of general and complete disarmament. They see the principal guarantee of the security of States, the principal way of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war, not in the retention of any particular quantities of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of the disarmament process, but in the earliest possible and maximum possible comprehensive elimination of all delivery vehicles, as well as the nuclear weapons themselves.

To confirm this, reference could be made to the statement of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, at the meeting on 7 July when he said:

"The peoples of the world do not wish to live under the shadow of the nuclear menace. The great Powers appear to feel that their security depends on the 'nuclear umbrella'. Our own security, that of the non-nuclear countries, depends more on the destruction of all nuclear weapons than on the retention of such a minimum. (ENDC/PV.196, p.7)

We should like to introduce a more accurate detail into the point of view expressed by Mr. Gomez Robledo: not all the nuclear Powers advocate the retention of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union bases itself on the position that its own security, like the security of all other States, would be ensured in the most reliable way by the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles without exception in the very first stage of disarmament. We agree to the retention of a "nuclear umbrella", not at all because we consider it a necessary guarantee of security for the Soviet Union, but because we seek to bring the positions of the sides participating in the negotiations closer together, because we are striving for a compromise with our Western colleagues and, in answer to the fears expressed by them for their security during the process of general and complete disarmament, we have proposed to them an additional guarantee of security in the form of a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

Since the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" is a compromise approach to the solution of the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, it is logical that the working group should deal with precisely this proposal, which takes into account the interests of both sides. The way we understand the matter is that in this regard the proposals of the delegations of the non-aligned States concerning the terms of reference of the working group approach the subject from the correct angle, since the proposals of the delegations of Sweden, Nigeria and the United



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Arab Republic provide that the working group should deal with concrete questions concerning the organization, structure and composition of the "nuclear umbrella" or "shield". At the meeting on 28 July Mrs. Myrdal said the following on this score:

"... our suggestion is that the working group ... should be given the specific assignment of elaborating a formula for such a 'mix' of types and quantities of nuclear delivery vehicles as would be suitable for an agreement on a nuclear shield of low capacity ..." (ENDC/PV.202, p.10)

The same idea, as we understand, was reflected directly in the formulations for the basis of the activities of the working group which were suggested by the delegations of the United Arab Republic and Nigeria. At the same time, for the sake of truth, it should be recognized that in the suggestion of the delegation of India this part of the formulation is laid down in a less distinct manner. The same can be said of the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia, Lij Imru, at the meeting on 30 June (ENDC/PV.194, p.28).

When we say that in our opinion the suggestions of the non-aligned States on the terms of reference of the working group are based in the main on a realistic approach to the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and precisely for this reason contain important constructive elements, we of course do not mean at all that we consider everything in these proposals equally useful and acceptable. No; in certain of their aspects the formulations for the basis of the activities of the working group which have been suggested by the delegations of the non-aligned States seem to us not entirely successful or, at least, insufficiently clear from the point of view of the main criterion: namely, the necessity of eliminating the threat of thermonuclear war at the very beginning of the disarmament process.

In this connexion I am bound to observe that we have noted that the Swedish delegation admits the possibility of applying the percentage principle to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles not included in the "nuclear shield" (ENDC/PV.202, p.10). We do not think that, even in this version of the percentage approach which has been put forward by the Swedish delegation, it would be possible to find a constructive solution to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The principle of a percentage reduction of these vehicles, as has been shown in the course of our discussions, is contrary to the idea of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war at the earliest stage of disarmament and cannot therefore serve as a basis for the solution of the problem of eliminating delivery vehicles.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In the statements made by the delegations of some non-aligned States on the question of the terms of reference for the activities of the working group, some other considerations have been put forward as well. We have, in particular, the suggestion of the delegation of Sweden that the working group should study specific questions, taking as a starting-point the "mix" of the "nuclear shield" at the third stage of general and complete disarmament (*ibid.*, pp. 9 *et seq.*). In this connexion Mrs. Myrdal expressed ideas which should obviously be thought over. However, we should like to point out at once that there are no reasons for the "nuclear umbrella" or "shield" being in the first stages, in its structure, capacity and "mix", in any respect different from what it would be in the third stage.

In this question, however, one should above all bear in mind what we have already stated on several occasions: namely, that any talk about a working group is as a matter of fact premature and pointless until we here in the Committee have reached agreement on that aspect of the matter which concerns the principle. This means that we must first agree here that we accept the idea of a "nuclear umbrella" to be established at the first stage of disarmament and to be retained until the end of the disarmament process. Not until we do will there be any sense in setting up a working group to deal with the practical questions connected with the implementation of the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella".

The idea put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan (ENDC/PV.198, p.17), and subsequently in a somewhat different form by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal (ENDC/PV.202, pp.11,12), also requires further study. This idea is that the precise aims and possibilities of using the "nuclear umbrella" in the disarmament process should be defined. It cannot be denied that the posing of such a question is to some extent justified. When, where and how it would be most appropriate to seek for its solution is another matter. This also needs to be thought over.

What, then, is the situation, if we sum up all these considerations arising in connexion with the suggestions of the delegations of the non-aligned States on the question of the basis for the activities of the working group? Although, as we have already pointed out, not everything in these suggestions can be accepted and certain points in them require, as we have already said, further study, at the

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same time we can say that the suggestions of the non-aligned States are on the whole in the right, constructive direction; they contain a number of valuable ideas and can consequently provide useful material in the search for an agreed solution.

Whether this will be done depends on the delegations of the United States and the other Western Powers. We, for our part, are prepared to continue work on this question and, in explaining in greater detail today our attitude towards the suggestions of the non-aligned States, we wished precisely to help to bring about progress in this regard. We think it important that the United States delegation should express in the Committee its attitude towards these suggestions. This is necessary in any case, in order to ascertain the possibilities of making progress.

Tomorrow it will be exactly one year since the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed. You will remember with what satisfaction and sincere joy this event was greeted throughout the world. The signing of the Moscow Treaty was evaluated by the nations as the first great success in the struggle for the relaxation of international tension. Millions of people hoped that, after the signing of the Treaty banning nuclear tests, States would take further steps to reduce the arms race and strengthen peace.

The Governments of the States which were the original parties to the Moscow Treaty expressed at that time the firm intention of going further along the road towards the lessening of international tension. Thus the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said then:

"... now the main thing is not to stop at what has been achieved and not to end the struggle against the threat of a new war, for the reduction of international tension, and for a stable peace throughout the world".

The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rusk, when signing the Moscow Treaty, stated:

"If collectively we and other nations pursue a course to insure that the forward momentum of this agreement is maintained by further steps, man's long, hopeful quest for peace will cease to be only a dream and will begin to acquire solid reality." (Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1261, 26 August 1963, p. 314)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, at that time the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and now Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, pointed out that after the signature of the Treaty banning nuclear tests the task would be to continue and complete the efforts that had been begun.

And in fact, after the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the three environments, additional steps followed promoting the growth of confidence and the reduction of international tension and of the arms race, such as the reaching of agreement to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884 (LVIII)), the decision of a number of States to reduce their military budgets, and the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes in the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom (ENDC/131,132).

However, after these steps the development of events in the direction of slowing down the arms race seemed to stop, and there have even appeared signs of a movement backwards. The most dangerous of these signs is undoubtedly the speeding up by certain States of the negotiations for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, within the framework of which it is proposed to allow the West German revenge-seekers to have access to nuclear weapons. At the same time in the Eighteen-Nation Committee there has been no real progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, or even on individual measures to slow down the arms race. Such a course of events cannot but cause anxiety.

Nevertheless we are convinced that, if all the participants in the negotiations approach the questions which we are discussing from a position of goodwill and with a real desire to achieve practical results, it will undoubtedly prove possible to move forward. Such possibilities exist both on the question of general and complete disarmament and in the field of collateral, partial measures. Such an important, urgent question as the conclusion of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can undoubtedly be solved also. The Soviet delegation appeals to all members of the Committee to exert the utmost efforts to achieve positive results in our negotiations before the end of the present session of the Committee.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to submit a few comments on the question of setting up a working group, but before doing so, may I recall that this is the first anniversary of the signing of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1)? This significant step was greeted by all peace-loving peoples as a

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

concrete foretoken of a turn for the better in the evolution of international relations, towards a relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of mutual confidence among States. The signing of the Moscow Treaty was welcomed as evidence that, also in a field directly connected with the solution of such important disarmament problems as are those concerning nuclear disarmament, it is possible to achieve agreement if goodwill and readiness are shown by all the parties concerned.

Thus the Moscow Treaty strengthened the hope throughout the world that other problems could be solved in the course of further negotiations, and provided an important stimulus for our work. The hopes placed on the signing of the Moscow Treaty were confirmed last year by a favourable development the concrete result of which was the adoption, at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, of a resolution banning the placing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit in outer space (A/RES/1884(XVIII)), and the announcement by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America at the end of last year that they would reduce their respective military budgets. It should be the aim of our Committee to encourage such developments. All the greater, therefore, was our disappointment and, I would say, anxiety when my delegation listened today to the report of the co-Chairmen that their talks concerning the establishment of a working group had failed to lead to agreement.

The question of setting up a working group has been the focus of attention in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament during the last three weeks. During the discussion of this question it seems to us that basically two views have become crystallized. On the one hand, there is the point of view which starts from the position that it is high time the Committee proceeded to a businesslike and practical discussion of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by setting up a working group which would begin the study of this problem on the basis of acceptance in principle by the Committee of the concept of a "nuclear umbrella". On the other hand, the delegations of the Western countries demand that the working group should discuss all plans for the elimination of delivery vehicles, including plans which are based on absolutely opposite concepts.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

In its statements the Czechoslovak delegation has shown why we consider that the establishment of a working group would open up a real possibility for achieving progress in the negotiations on the elimination of delivery vehicles only on condition that all the States participating in the work of such a group start out from a common concept and set about the negotiations with the same objective. Only in that case is it possible to speak of an effective discussion of the proposals submitted so as to reconcile them and find an acceptable solution.

We consider that, given that condition, the establishment of a working group would be a step which would be welcomed by all who are really interested in achieving progress in solving the problems of general and complete disarmament. This has been fully confirmed also by the way in which the delegations of the non-aligned States have actively joined in the efforts to solve this problem. Mr. Tsarapkin has today drawn attention to their efforts. In striving to make it easier to find a common basis, some of those delegations have submitted suggestions for defining the terms of reference of the working group. In our earlier statements we pointed out that those suggestions were on the whole in the right direction -- that is, that the basis for the negotiations on nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be acceptance of the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" or a minimum deterrent and the elimination of all the remaining delivery vehicles in as short a period as possible.

In fact, the only obstacle preventing a working group from setting to work very soon is the position of the delegations of the Western countries, which stubbornly persist in clinging to their unacceptable proposal for a percentage reduction of delivery vehicles and have not shown the slightest readiness to seek for a mutually-acceptable basis for further negotiations. Moreover, the representatives of the Western delegations attempt to shift the responsibility for the lack of agreement on the establishment of a working group on to the delegations of the socialist countries. As we have already heard a good many times recently, they declare that the socialist delegations link the establishment of a working group with an unacceptable preliminary condition under which the group would be able to discuss the proposal of only one side: namely the Soviet Union; whereas in contrast to this the Western delegations allegedly adopt a flexible position on this question and agree that the working group should discuss the proposals of all parties.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Frankly, there can be no question of any flexibility in such a position of the Western delegations. If we were to accept the position adopted by our Western colleagues it would only lead to the establishment of a working group as a matter of form, but it would be quite obvious beforehand that its work would be unable to produce the desired results. In fact, the fruitless general discussion which has already been going on for many months in our Committee would be transferred to the forum of that group. In such a situation the establishment of a working group would be devoid of any practical sense. The adoption of the demand of our Western colleagues would inevitably lead to a formal discussion the nature of which would be predetermined, not by a desire to find a common basis, but rather by the aim of showing the unacceptability of the proposals of the other side.

This conclusion is based on a thoroughly realistic appraisal of the situation. After all, the whole position of the Western delegations shows that they are unwilling to accept any solution to the problem of delivery vehicles other than a percentage reduction. On the other hand, the socialist delegations have shown on the basis of numerous facts why this Western idea for the solution of the problem of delivery vehicles is unacceptable to them. Therefore we are fully justified in asking what this "flexibility" in defining the programme of the working group would lead to. The only result of such a method would be the creation of the false and baseless illusion that some progress had been made in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, whereas in actual fact the situation would remain unchanged.

In this connexion I should like to revert to the repeated allegation that the socialist delegations insist that the working group should study only the Soviet proposal. It has already been shown here a number of times that such an allegation is completely groundless, and that it is an attempt to distort our coherent position. Acceptance of the principle of a nuclear umbrella or minimum deterrent has nothing to do with the demand that the working group should study the proposal of only one side. Such acceptance merely expresses the aim which we are all bound to pursue in our negotiations: namely, the earliest possible elimination of the threat of nuclear war by eliminating all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except those to be retained within the framework of the nuclear umbrella, at the very first stage of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

That is the key question of the whole process of general and complete disarmament, and any attempt to evade it is not only unlikely to facilitate our negotiations but, on the contrary, can merely lead to further delay in them. The socialist delegations have directly stressed on many occasions that in the working group it would be possible to study without any obstacle whatsoever all proposals based on that concept.

Our Western colleagues sometimes level at us the reproach that our concept of a "nuclear umbrella" is basically identical with the proposal of Mr. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). We have to admit that we do not understand the logic of that reproach. In fact, since the Gromyko proposal was submitted the socialist delegations have pointed out that it is based on the principle of the retention of a "nuclear umbrella", that in our opinion it is a practical formulation of that concept, and that it reflects our ideas of what the application of the principle of the retention of a minimum deterrent should look like in practice.

At the same time we state that, in our opinion, the principle laid down in the Gromyko proposal should be taken as the basis for negotiations in the working group. Moreover, it is perfectly clear -- and this has been stressed by the representatives of the socialist delegations -- that the Gromyko proposal is not a project worked out in detail, but that it merely lays down a definite principle. It is clear that, in the event of a working group being set up, all delegations would be able to submit their own concrete and detailed proposals which would ensure the implementation of the principle of a "nuclear umbrella".

It is obvious, of course, that the "nuclear umbrella" concept differs from the concept of the Western proposal for a percentage reduction (ENDC/30). But in our opinion it is a reasonable and mutually-acceptable compromise. It cannot be disputed, as Mr. Tsarapkin pointed out this morning, that in accepting the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" the Soviet Government made considerable concessions in comparison with its original proposal (ENDC/2) and its original idea for the solution of the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles.



(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

I do not think there is any need to revert to that subject. I am bound to say, however, that it would be contrary to the very idea of "negotiations", to the very principle of striving to achieve agreement through mutual concessions, to expect or demand that in the matter of delivery vehicles the Soviet Union should agree to the concept of a percentage reduction. That would not be a compromise but would be acceptance of the Western position. We consider that acceptance of the "nuclear umbrella" principle constitutes a reasonable and fully-acceptable compromise. If anyone adopts a rigid position, it is precisely the delegations of the Western countries, which are unwilling to take the path of such a compromise.

So far in the negotiations we have heard the most varied objections to the concept of the retention of a "nuclear umbrella". Most often it is alleged that the retention of a minimum deterrent at the end of the first stage would upset the existing balance and therefore would be contrary to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). But I should like to point out that the Western delegations have not proved this assertion with any convincing facts. They have been unable to adduce a single cogent proof that the retention of a "nuclear umbrella", in conjunction with other measures which would be carried out during the first stage of general and complete disarmament, would give any unilateral advantage to one of the sides or endanger the security of any State.

On the other hand, the delegations of the socialist countries have adduced very serious arguments which justify our impression that the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is motivated by a desire to obtain certain unilateral advantages. It is appropriate to recall that the Western delegations have so far failed to adduce anything to refute our arguments. Furthermore, it is well known that even the Western Powers themselves do not apply the principle of a percentage reduction with complete consistency. For instance, where nuclear weapons and the numbers of armed forces are concerned, they propose an altogether different method. Then why do they insist so stubbornly that in regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles the only way to ensure equal security is precisely the way of a percentage reduction ?

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

That is how we see the present situation in regard to the possibility of setting up a working group. In our opinion, the Soviet delegation has submitted a clear, perfectly reasonable and realistic proposal which would make it possible for the negotiations in the working group to be not simply a repetition of the previous -- I would say -- fruitless discussions, but a real step forward in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

We are compelled to note with regret that this effort, which is supported by the other socialist delegations and by the delegations of the non-aligned countries in our Committee, has not met with a proper response from the Western delegations. Although their representatives declare in words their readiness to agree to the establishment of a working group, where the definition of its tasks is concerned they adopt a position which, in our view, would deprive the working group beforehand of any sense whatsoever. Therefore it is up to the Western Powers to show in fact some flexibility and a desire to contribute to the search for a mutually-acceptable basis for the establishment of a working group and for its activities. That, in our opinion, is the basic condition for achieving progress in the negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of the United States.

It is disappointing to my delegation that the co-Chairmen have so far been unable to agree on the basis for a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles. It is especially disappointing because we are dealing here with a relatively straightforward procedural matter. All the necessary ingredients for the creation of a working group seem to be present. First, there is general agreement that a nuclear deterrent should be retained by both sides throughout the disarmament process. Second, we all seem agreed, as the representative of the United Arab Republic pointed out (ENDC/PV.198, p.16), that the time has come for detailed studies of the technical problems involved in reducing nuclear vehicles. Third, every delegation has welcomed the idea of a working group as a forum for such studies.

(The Chairman, United States)

In regard to the scope of the working group, it should of course operate in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). Moreover, logic dictates that the terms of reference for the working group should flow from our plenary discussions on item 5b (ENDC/52). This means that the group should consider the various positions taken on the broad problem of nuclear delivery vehicles during those discussions. However, the group should not be limited by the arbitrary adoption of a principle for reduction of nuclear vehicles which is not mutually agreed by the nuclear sides.

Taking those factors into consideration, the non-aligned members of our Committee have tried to help us to find a suitable formula for the group's basis. They recognize that it is impossible to press beyond the degree of agreement reached to date, and that the terms of reference will have to reflect the true situation. Mrs. Myrdal succinctly expressed this view in her very thoughtful and interesting statement of 28 July. Referring to the general agreement on the retention of a nuclear deterrent -- or "nuclear shield", as she described it -- throughout the disarmament process as sufficient basis for a working group, she said:

"All other issues -- such as those of the size, character, composition and deployment of those forces, as well as the timing of the reductions needed to reach the agreed level, amounting to an elimination of all other means of nuclear delivery -- must be considered in the second place, as 'modalities', appropriate for settlement after technical scrutiny in a working group." (ENDC/PV.202, p.6)

Statements by other non-aligned speakers have reflected the same conviction that the scope of the working group should not be too restricted. Mr. Obi, on 23 June, stressed that the forum should be given flexibility of approach and hoped that the working group would confirm "the soundness of one plan or the other, or, even more likely and appropriately, a realistic compromise solution." (ENDC/PV.192, p.19) Lij Imru, on 30 June, stated that the working group should "examine and appraise all proposals" (ENDC/PV.194, p.28). At the same meeting Mr. Nehru stipulated that the working group should not be confined to the proposals of only one side (*ibid*, p.11). On 14 July Mr. Hassan specified that no party should impose its plan as the sole basis for the terms of reference of the working group (ENDC/PV.198, p.16). Mr. Gomez Robledo also made it clear that the terms of reference should be precise as well as flexible (ENDC/PV.196, p.6).

(The Chairman, United States)

If the non-aligned States have not succeeded in finding a middle road between the Soviet and United States approaches to the working group, it is because the two approaches are qualitatively different -- and this has been made abundantly clear again this morning by Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Kurka. Whereas the Soviet delegation is presenting its position on nuclear delivery vehicles, the United States is presenting a procedural concept for a working group. Some of the non-aligned delegations have referred to terms such as "minimum deterrent" or "nuclear umbrella", hoping that somehow these terms could represent the compromise between the two sides; but this is like trying to mix oil and water. Unfortunately there is no present basis for agreement on such terminology.

Mr. Tsarapkin has urged acceptance of the "principle of the nuclear umbrella"; but on 21 July he very clearly stated that this so-called "nuclear umbrella" to which he referred was "a very strictly limited and agreed quantity of inter-continental, anti-missile and ground-to-air missiles". (ENDC/PV.200, p.23) The Soviet representative is very simply asking us to accept the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) as the sole basis for the working group. In so doing he is also asking us to exclude discussion of the United States plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3), and he did so again this morning. Western questions and doubts about the Gromyko proposal are well known to all representatives. As regards the working group, however, we have always maintained our readiness to examine that proposal in detail, even on a priority basis. We have refused only to accept it "sight unseen" and to abandon our own proposal in its favour.

We naturally desire discussion by a working group of our plan for percentage reductions. We still regard it as a sound and practical approach to the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles. But we have never asked for discussion of our plan alone. In fact, we do not believe that any specific principle for reduction needs to be agreed on before the establishment of a working group. We know, as does the Soviet representative, that no agreement on nuclear vehicle reduction will be possible until there has been a careful and detailed examination of both our positions, an examination which can better be done in a working group than in plenary meetings.

(The Chairman, United States)

At one time we found encouragement in the Soviet statement that the working group should consider all proposals; but it has gradually become clear that this statement referred only to proposals coming under the so-called "nuclear umbrella"; and then it turned out, as I have indicated, that the "nuclear umbrella" was really the Gromyko proposal.

As Mrs. Myrdal pointed out last week, it is premature to expect unanimity on specifics before a detailed study is made (ENDC/PV.202, p.6). This is a matter on which we must be realistic. It will not help us to establish a working group on the basis of terminology which has been given a definite meaning by one side only. We do not believe that the non-aligned speakers using the term "nuclear umbrella" intended to support the Gromyko plan. Yet that is precisely what the Soviet representative means by this term.

On 21 July I set forth the concept which we believe serves the interests of all concerned -- namely,

"... the retention of agreed levels of nuclear delivery vehicles throughout the disarmament process, with the elimination of all other nuclear delivery vehicles at the earliest practicable time consistent with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles". (ENDC/PV.200, pp.19,20).

This concept reflects the elements of agreement between the Soviet and Western plans for nuclear vehicle reduction which we believe are adequate for an effective working group. It would allow discussion of all relevant proposals, in the spirit expressed by the non-aligned delegations. We believe that it meets their desire for terms of reference which are flexible and yet precise enough to allow progress towards an increased area of agreement between our two positions.

We hope that it will yet be possible to find a basis for establishing a working group before the end of this session. Agreement on such a working group would in our view be a valuable step in maintaining the hopeful atmosphere which has been created by the limited test ban agreement. We shall continue in the co-Chairmen meetings to seek such agreement.

Mr. TAHOUDIN (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak this morning, but I should like to join our Soviet, United States and Czechoslovak colleagues in recalling that tomorrow will be the first anniversary of the Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100, Rev.1).

(Mr. Tahourdin, United Kingdom)

As the representative here of one of the original signatories, I should like in particular to emphasize the importance of the preliminary work which ~~was~~ done in this Committee in bringing about the Treaty. Since its signature by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the Treaty has been adhered to by a very great majority of States throughout the world. It has come rightly to stand as a landmark in the progress we are all seeking towards our common aim of a disarmed and peaceful world. It is, as we all recognize, only a beginning, but it has served to show that a beginning can be made. I suggest that we cannot do better in recalling the signature of the Treaty on its first anniversary than redouble our efforts towards new and even more far-reaching agreements.

As regards the main subject under discussion today, the question of establishing a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles, this has seemed to us a subject on which real, if not necessarily so dramatic, progress could and should be made this year. In the circumstances I confess to some disappointment at the statements we have heard this morning from our Eastern colleagues. We shall, of course, study their statements very carefully in the verbatim record. We may wish to comment on them more fully at a later meeting. But, from what I heard in the simultaneous interpretation, their statements did not appear to represent any significant advance on the previous Eastern position as regards the establishment of a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles. As I have said, however, we shall study these statements very carefully in the verbatim record.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 204th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Clare Timberlake, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the United States and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 6 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.